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INTRODUCTION

The recent United States Supreme Court opinion in Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit1 is critical to
parties and attorneys who participate in environmental litigation.
Leatherman proscribed the imposition of pleading requirements that
are stricter than those ordinarily applied under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a). Such heightened pleading requirements compel
plaintiffs to plead more facts, and courts can dismiss claims that fall
short of the mark.
The Leatherman court considered civil rights actions alleging that
municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 2 Although
Leatherman might seem of limited relevance to environmental lawsuits, its holding and reasoning appear sufficiently broad to encompass environmental litigation. 3 Numerous federal circuit and
district courts have recently required that plaintiffs plead with particularity in environmental actions, principally cases pursued under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCl.A). 4 Leatherman may prohibit elevated pleading in environmental litigation. This article analyzes whether the
Supreme Court has proscribed heightened pleading in environmental lawsuits in Leatherman and the consequences of that prohibition.
Part I examines the origins and development of elevated pleading
requirements in certain types of cases. This Part considers the rise
of heightened pleading in civil rights actions and its extension to
environmental suits, emphasizing the leading case of Cash Energy v.
Weiner. 5 Part II evaluates the Supreme Court's opinion in
Leatherman and finds that the decision is expansive enough to
include environmental actions. The final Part assesses Leatherman's
implications for environmental litigation.
113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993).
Id. at 1161. Leatherman has been applied by courts in subsequent
environmental cases. See Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon Products, 820 F.
Supp. 116, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (refusing to apply heightened pleading
standards in CERCLA case). In an unreported opinion, another court applied
Leatherman to defeat a heightened pleading request in a case seeking recovery
for hazardous waste cleanup costs. PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams, No. 93-C1379, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9286, at *9 (N.D. Ill.July 7, 1993).
3 See WmwickAdmin. Group, 820 F. Supp. at 120; PMC, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9286, at *9.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. 1990).
5 768 F. Supp. 892 (D. Mass. 1991).
i

2
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DEVELOPMENT OF ELEVATED PLEADING

The Adoption of Ru/,e 8 and the Imposition of E/euated P/,eading in
Civil Rights Cases

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which governs pleading,
requires that a plaintiff submit a "short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. "6 The members
of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules that suggested this
Rule in 1938 intended the rule to clarify and simplify prior common
law and code pleading while deemphasizing the importance of the
pleadings. 7 During the mid-1950s, the Civil Rules Committee
refused to implement recommendations of judges in the Ninth Circuit that would have revived earlier forms of pleading. No substantive recommendations for change in pleading have been adopted. 8
The Supreme Court subscribed to the flexible, liberal pleading
system incorporated in the Federal Rules, sta~ng in Conley v. Gibson
that a "[c]omplaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief. "9 The Court, therefore, repudiated fact pleading and
adopted notice pleading. The Court stated that the Rules required
only "a short and plain statement of the claim" to give the defendant
fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and its grounds. Io
Although the Supreme Court opinion in Conley might have
seemed to sound the death knell for pleading practice, defendants
persisted in filing motions to dismiss and judges continued granting
them. I I Since the 1970s, many judges have demanded stricter
pleading of plaintiffs bringing specific types of suits. The preemi6 FED. R CIV. P. 8(a). If plaintiffs complaint does not satisfy Rule 8,
defendant can file a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). I rely substantially
in this subsection on Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pl.eading Under the
Federal Ruf.es of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986); Carl To bias, Public
Law Litigation and the Federal Ruf.es of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 270,
296-301 (1989).
7 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 439-40; David M. Roberts, Fact P/.eading, Notice
Pl.eading and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 396 (1980).
s See Marcus, supra note 6, at 445; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The Federal Ruf.es of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 909, 983-84 (1987).
9 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted).
IO Id. at 47. See generally Marcus, supra note 6, at 442-46 (discussing
encouragement of flexible pleading practices by federal courts).
I I See Marcus, supra note 6, at 434.
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nent examples are civil rights cases. As early as 1984, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit proclaimed that all of the circuit courts had "articulated a requirement
of particularity in pleading for civil rights complaints." 12 Courts'
requirements differ substantially, especially in the specificity
demanded. 13
B.

Elevated Pkading in Areas Other than Environmental Cases

Federal courts have required heightened pleading primarily in
civil rights cases. 14 Nonetheless, judges have recently extended the
concept to other substantive areas, for two major reasons. First, the
escalating expense of litigation has made the threat of false claims
or defenses powerful weapons of intimidation, increasing the temptation to invoke them. 15 Second, judges have been concerned that
additional frivolous claims or defenses impair the system-wide quality of justice, particularly in light of the litigation explosion. 16
Important fields in which judges have expanded heightened pleading include securities, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Federal Torts Claims Act, and antitrust
Ii ligation. 17
12 Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1084 (1985); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751F.2d1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985).
13 The majority and specially concurring opinions of Judge Goldberg in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit,
954 F.2d 1054, 1055, 1058 (5th Cir. 1992), review much relevant case law. Two
circuits seem to have opposed heightened pleading. See Elliott v. Thomas, 937
F.2d 338, 345 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1242 (1992); Karim-Panahi
v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). But see Branch
v. Tunnell, 937 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1991).
14 See Cash Energy v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D. Mass. 1991). See
generally Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pl.eading
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 935 (1990)
(analyzing heightened pleading requirements for civil rights actions); Tobias,
supra note 6, at 297-301 (discussing heightened pleading requirement, its effect
on civil rights litigants); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pl.eading Rul.e for Civil Rights
Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677 (1984) (discussing
imposition of stricter pleading requirements for civil rights cases).
15 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898; accord United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852
F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 946 (1980).
16 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898; accord Sutliff Inc. v. Donovan Co., 727 F.2d
648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984).
17 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898-99 (discussing other areas and relevant cases).
See generally Marcus, supra note 6, at 439; Tobias, supra note 6, at 296-301.
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El£vated Pleading in Environmental Cases

Weiner

Since the 1980s, many federal judges have imposed elevated
pleading in environmental cases, most of which involved CERClA. 18
Cash Energy v. Weiner is important, because Judge Robert E. Keeton,
its author, comprehensively treated numerous relevant issues. Keeton then served as Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (Standing Committee) of the Judicial Conference, which
has substantial responsibility for revision of all Federal Rules. 19
Given Weiner's thorough analysis and its author's role in the civil
procedure area, a close examination of the decision enhances
understanding of the issues posed by heightened pleading
requirements.
Judge Keeton in Weiner fully reviewed the pertinent history of the
requirement that plaintiffs plead with particularity. 20 Judge Keeton
first acknowledged the flexible, liberal pleading regime created in
the original 1938 Rules. He recognized that the Supreme Court had
stamped its imprimatur on this system and on notice pleading in
Conley. 21 Judge Keeton observed, however, that even the Federal
Rules sow the "seeds of a countervailing tendency. "22 He specifically
invoked Rule 9 (b), which expressly requires particularized pleading
in cases involving fraud and mistake; Rule 8(£), which provides that
pleadings are to be interpreted to promote substantial justice; and
18 A few of the cases involved other environmental statutes, such as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988). See,
e.g., McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 856 F.2d 39, 43 (6th Cir. 1988);
Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338, 1340
(N.D. Ind. 1991), aff'd, 973 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1992).
19 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897-900.
The Standing Committee is a
thirteen-member body comprised of federal judges, law professors, and
practitioners, which Congress has authorized to study the Federal Rules and to
formulate proposals for change as needed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (Supp. 1993).
See generally Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive History of Federal Rul.e 15(c) and Its
Lessons for Civil Rul.es Revision, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1507 (1987) (discussing rule
revision entities); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discuvery and the Politics of Rul.emaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 797 n.2 (1991)
(citing sources that discuss composition and role of Advisory Committee).
20 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897-99; see also supra notes 6-13 and
accompanying text (similar history).
21 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) );
see also supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (similar history).
22 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897.
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Rule 12(e), which prescribes motions for more definite statements
and the possibility of striking deficient pleadings. 23
Judge Keeton remarked that courts needed the elevated requirements for pleading fraud under Rule 9(b) to help prevent abuse of
legal processes. 24 Moreover, courts have extended this exception
for fraud to similar statutory causes of action because analogous
considerations apply. 25 Courts have also created new exceptions in
fields that present compelling reasons for elevated pleading.
Finally, Keeton stated that courts demand particularity in pleading
to promote substantial justice and to address due process concerns
over a plaintiff's request for a drastic remedy. 26
Judge Keeton in Weiner explained that the imposition of heightened pleading in civil rights cases was a response to litigants filing
unfounded claims. 27 He found that courts have increasingly
required particularity because of fears about false claims and
defenses and the threat that frivolous litigation poses for the federal
court system. 28 He also observed that these concerns had fostered
the 1983 amendments to Rules 11 and 26 that place enhanced
responsibilities upon lawyers and parties for the representations that
they make in pleadings and in discovery papers. 29
Judge Keeton summarized this history by stating that the pleading
strictures have become less forgiving, that judges have demanded
particularity more frequently, and that courts have permitted
reduced discovery before requiring that pleaders allege sufficient
facts to "support a claim on which relief can be granted or a defense
23

Id.; see also FED. R Crv. P. 9(b), 8(£), 12(e).

24 Wein~'"

768 F. Supp. at 897.

Id.; see also id. at 898-99 (citing securities, RICO, and labor litigation and
relevant case authority). See generally Marcus, supra note 6, at 450-55 (noting
25

heightened pleading requirements for conspiracy allegations).
26 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898-99; accurd United States v. Pole No. 3172, 852
F.2d 636, 638 (1st Cir. 1988); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text
(discussing promoting substantial justice).
27 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 897-98. But see Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi,
532 F.2d 920, 925, 927 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons,]., dissenting); Wingate, supra
note 14, at 688.
28 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898; see also supra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text.
29 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 899. See generally Carl Tobias, Ru/,e 11 and Civil
Rights Litigation, 37 BuFF. L. REv. 485 (1988-89) [hereafter Tobias, Ru/,e 11]
(criticizing chilling effect of Rule 11 on civil rights litigation); Carl Tobias,
judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rul.es, 43 RUTGERS
L. REv. 933, 940-42, 946-48 (1991) [hereafter Tobias, Discretion] (discussing how
Rules 11 and 26 disadvantage civil rights litigants).
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on which judgment can be entered. "30 Judge Keeton candidly
acknowledged the danger that this trend could be extended too far,
and recognized the need to strike an appropriate balance among
the various relevant interests. 31 He contended that an elevated standard should thwart frivolous allegations while providing parties
access to the information they need to prove their cases. 32
In a concluding paragraph, Judge Keeton asked whether CERCLA
was another field in which courts would demand heightened pleading. 33 Keeton observed that CERCLA was difficult to analogize to
fraud. Even so, he stated that CERCLA implicates numerous factors
that prompt judges to require stricter pleading in cases other than
fraud. 34 The most significant factor for Judge Keeton was the great
expense of defending against a non-meritorious claim. He argued
that particularized pleading would limit meritless claims. 35 Keeton,
therefore, found it reasonable to predict that higher courts would
extend elevated pleading requirements to CERCLA litigation, and
would apply certain ameliorating factors to protect plaintiffs who
need discovery. 36
The principal difficulty with the Weiner opinion is that Judge Keeton premised his decision almost exclusively on public policy considerations relevant to the litigation explosion, abuses of the litigation
process, and litigation costs. 37 The opinion did not allude to other
policy factors, namely clear congressional intent to clean up the
30 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 899-900. See generally Tobias, Ruk 11, supra note
29, at 495-98 (discussing judicial application of Rule 11 in civil rights cases,
procedural difficulties civil rights litigants confront).
31 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 900; see also New England Data Services v. Becher,
829 F.2d 286, 291 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting need to strike balance among
conflicting interests, including plaintiffs' need for discovery).
32 See Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 900. See generally Tobias, Ruk 11, supra note 29,
at 495-98 (discussing civil rights plaintiffs' access problems); Carl Tobias, Ruk
11 Reconsidered, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 867, 876, 891, 897 (1992) (discussing
balancing of interests considered in Rule 11 reform).
33 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 900.

Id.
Id. Keeton also mentioned that the "consequences of individual liability
for an environmental violation may be severe." Id.
36 Id. The court so ruled, "[u]nless and until guidance to the contrary
appears in legislation or precedent." Id.; see supra note 31 and accompanying
34

35

text.
37 See, e.g., supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supra
note 6, at 287-89 (discussing litigation explosion and litigation abuse and citing
relevant secondary authority).
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environment, as expressed in the CERCIA statutory scheme. 38
These considerations are at least as relevant as the factors that Keeton considered. 39 The Weiner case also mentioned no opinions
involving the environment,40 although Judge Keeton examined a
wealth of precedent requiring particularized pleading in a number
of substantive fields of law. 41
2.

Additional Relevant Cases

a.

Cases Imposing Elevated Pl.eading

Numerous federal district judges have required elevated pleading
in CERCIA and other environmental cases. For example, a Northern District of Indiana judge stated that a Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA) complaint must include allegations
regarding every material element of each asserted claim. This judge
found deficient a pleading that contained only bare legal conclusions attached to narrated facts. 42 Judges in the District of Colorado
and the Southern District of New York have similarly found that
pleadings including conclusory allegations that merely track CERCIA' s language are insufficient. 43
Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in McGregor v. Industrial Excess Land.fil~ held that plaintiffs must
specifically allege in complaints "either the costs they incurred ...
or the actions they took in response to the allegedly hazardous conditions. "44 The Middle District of Pennsylvania applied this ruling
38 The major purpose of CERCLA is to clean up hazardous waste sites. See,
e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1237
(M.D. Pa. 1990); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.NJ. 1983).
39 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
40 Quite a few existed, however, at the time that Judge Keeton issued Weiner.
See, e.g., Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338
(N.D. Ind. 1991); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1468 (D. Colo.
1991); see also infra notes 42-52, 63-65 and accompanying text.
41 Weiner, 768 F. Supp. at 898-99; see also supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
42 See Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. at 1340. But cf CBS v. Henkin, 803 F.
Supp. 1426, 1432 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (rejecting elevated pleading in CERCLA
cases).
43 See Cook, 755 F. Supp. at 1475; Bradley Indus. Park v. Xerox Corp., No. 88
CIV. 7574 (CSH), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1492, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1991).
44 See McGregor v. Industrial Excess Landfill, 856 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir.
1988).
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in Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc. 45 The district judge in Ambrogi provided
comparatively expansive treatment of several issues relevant to elevated pleading.
The court in Ambrogi analogized to Third Circuit civil rights
cases46 and invoked policy concepts, articulated in Weiner, that seek
to protect defendants from meritless litigation. 47 The judge in
Ambrogi declared that the large number of environmental actions
could not justify the imposition of heightened pleading, 48 but that
particularity in pleading would help eliminate frivolous claims and
distinguish federal causes of action from state tort claims. Heightened pleading requirements would also give defendants adequate
notice of plaintiffs' claims, thus permitting defendants to formulate
appropriate responses. 49
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, followed a different approach in Ascon Properties v. Mobil Oil
Co. 50 In Ascon Properties, the court distinguished the Sixth Circuit's
McGregor holding on its facts. 51 The Ninth Circuit imposed a slightly
elevated requirement in CERCLA cases by stating that a "claimant
must allege at least one type of 'response' cost cognizable under
CERCLA [in order] to make out a prima fade case. "52

b.

Cases &jecting El,euated Pl.eading

Several judges have held that heightened pleading is not required
in CERCLA cases. Judges in the Northern District of New York and
in the Western District of New York observed that a CERCLA plain750 F. Supp. 1233, 1251-53 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
The Third Circuit has a reputation as the foremost proponent of elevated
pleading in civil rights cases. See, e.g., Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d
920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976) (requiring plaintiffs in civil rights cases to plead facts
with specificity); Marcus, supra note 6, at 449 (noting Third Circuit is leader in
movement to impose elevated pleading); see also Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 125152 (discussing pleading sufficiency).
47 For instance, the Ambrogi court subscribed to the idea that elevated
pleading "serves to protect . . . defendants who would be unduly burdened
defending frivolous actions." Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1252; see also Weiner, 768
F. Supp. at 897-98; supra notes 15-16, 27-28 and accompanying text.
48 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1252. But cf. supra notes 27-28 and accompanying
text (noting that large number of frivolous civil rights claims is often cited as
justification for elevated pleading).
49 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1252.
so 866 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1989).
51 Id. at 1156; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (providing Sixth
Circuit holding).
s2 Ascon Properties, 866 F.2d at 1154.
45

46
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tiff need not plead that it incurred particular costs. If the plaintiff
alleges that it has incurred and will continue to incur expenses and
costs, that pleading would suffice. 53 A Connecticut district judge
relied on these two opinions to hold that a plaintiff must allege that
it incurred response costs but is not required to particularize those
expenses. 54 The Connecticut court also distinguished the Sixth Circuit's McGregor holding on its facts and remarked that the plaintiff
had afforded the defendant fair notice of plaintiff's claim and the
grounds on which it rested. 55
A Northern District of Indiana judge refused to apply heightened
pleading for similar reasons. This court distinguished Weiner
because the plaintiff's pleadings accorded the defendant adequate
notice of plaintiff's legal theory. 56 Moreover, the judge stated that
numerous courts have held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8,
not Federal Rule 9, governs pleading in CERCl.A litigation. 57
Additional federal district judges have expressly or implicitly
rejected heightened pleading under CERCl.A. For example, one
judge in the Maryland District declined to require that CERCl.A
plaintiffs plead with particularity analogous to Rule 9(b)'s requirements.58 This court also stated that it would "continue to hold CERCl.A claims to the traditional pleading standards embodied in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)." 59 The judge specifically rejected defendant's
suggestion that it base elevated pleading on Weiner. 60 A Northern
District of New York judge, writing before Weiner, similarly refused
to impose heightened pleading. 61 This court declared that the
defendant had not submitted, nor had the judge discovered, any
53 See Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 713, 717
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 298
(N.D.N.Y 1984).
54 See Arawana Mills Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1243 (D. Conn. 1992).
55 Id. at 1243-44; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing
treatment of costs in McGregor).
56 CBS v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1426, 1432 (N.D. Ind. 1992). But cf.
Supporters to Oppose Pollution v. Heritage Group, 760 F. Supp. 1338, 1340
(N.D. Ind. 1991) (imposing elevated pleading in RCRA case).
57 Henkin, 803 F. Supp. at 1432. The court cited two cases treated below. See
infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. One case similar to Henkin is
Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1990). See also infra
note 64 and accompanying text.
58 United States v. Azrael, 774 F. Supp. 376, 379 (D. Md. 1991).
59 Id. at 379 n.6.
60 Id.
61 Stilloe v. Almy Bros., 759 F. Supp. 95, 104-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).
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rule or case authority to support an argument that CERClA cases
"must be pied with greater specificity than is required under Fed. R.
Civ. Proc. S(a)." 62
A New Hampshire District Court judge proclaimed that the Federal Rules do not require specificity in CERClA pleadings. This
judge flatly rejected defendant's contention that the court dismiss
plaintiff's CERClA claim for failing to specify certain response
costs. 63 A Northern District of Illinois judge acknowledged that the
CERClA test for holding corporate individuals liable is very factspecific. This judge, however, held that the Federal Rules' pleading
strictures do not "compel the specification of such facts in the
complaint. "64
In sum, a growing number of federal judges have required that
plaintiffs plead with particularity in environmental cases, especially
those involving CERClA. 65 The Weiner case is representative of this
trend, and provides analysis of many issues important to the imposition of elevated pleading. The Supreme Court's resolution of the
heightened pleading issue in civil rights suits against municipalities
also provides relevant analysis. This article next turns to the
Leatherman opinion to examine its arguments against elevated
pleading.
II.

ANALYSIS

A.

OF

LEATHERMAN

Leatherman

In Leatherman, the Supreme Court held that federal courts could
not impose a pleading standard more stringent than the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
civil rights cases alleging municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. Section
1983.66 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected the
argument that normal pleading would expose municipalities to time
consuming and costly discovery in all such actions, disrupting
municipal functions and emasculating municipal immunity. 67 He
Id. at 104.
Mesiti v. Microdot, 739 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D.N.H. 1989); accord New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 648 F. Supp. 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
64 Quadion Corp. v. Mache, 738 F. Supp. 270, 275 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
65 See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
66 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1161 (1993).
67 Id. at 1162. Numerous federal courts had relied on the disruption of
municipal functions rationale in imposing elevated pleading. See, e.g., Jones v.
62

63
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obseived that the contention improperly equated freedom from liability with immunity from suit. He also stated that municipalities do
not possess absolute or qualified immunity under Section 1983.
Municipalities could thus be found liable when their customs or policies cause the alleged constitutional injuries, regardless of the
pleading standard. 68
Rehnquist's opinion also refuted the suggestion that "heightened
pleading" was a misnomer, because the degree of particularity that
the Federal Rules requires varies with the complexity of the applicable substantive law. 69 The Court instead found elevated pleading
well-named. Enhanced pleading requirements demand more to
plead a complaint under Section 1983 than to plead other kinds of
claims for relief. 70
The Supreme Court then declared that it was impossible to reconcile heightened pleading with the liberal notice pleading system in
the Federal Rules. 71 ChiefJustice Rehnquist included a pair of classic, often-cited quotations from Conl,ey v. Gibson72 to defend notice
pleading:
Rule 8(a) (2) requires that a complaint include only "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." In Conley v. Gibson, we said in effect that the rule meant
what it said: "(T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require
a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his
claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is a 'short and plain
statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." 73

The Supreme Court next stated that Rule 9 (b) requires particularized pleading for fraud and mistake. 74 Chief Justice Rehnquist
remarked that the Federal Rules proscribe enhanced pleading
requirements for certain claims. The Rules fail to include among
these enumerated actions lawsuits against municipalities alleging liability under Section 1983. Therefore, following the maxim expressio
Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v.
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1980).
68 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1162.
69 Id.
10 Id. at 1162-63.
71 Id. at 1163; see al.so supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
72 355 U.S. 41 (1957); see al.so Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; supra notes 9-10
and accompanying text (discussing Conley).
73 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163 (citations omitted) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
74 Id.; see al.so FED. R Cw. P. 9(b).
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unius est exclusio alterius, 75 the Federal Rules do not impose heightened pleading for actions apart from fraud and mistake. 76

The Supreme Court obseived that claims which seek to impose
liability on municipalities for asserted constitutional violations of
their employees' rights dated from its 1961 opinion in Monell v. New
York City Department of Social Services, 77 which construed Section 1983
to permit liability. 78 The Court suggested that Section 1983 litigation might be included in the list of claims subject to particularized
pleading in Rule 9(b) if Federal Rules 8 and 9 were dfafted today. 79
Rehnquist claimed, however, that this result must be secured
through the rule revision process, rather than by judicial construction. 80 Without a Federal Rules amendment, Rehnquist stated that
district courts and parties must depend on motions for summary
judgment and control of discovery to eliminate meritless cases
sooner in the litigation process. 81
The Supreme Court properly rejected elevated pleading in
Leatherman because that requirement violated the letter and spirit of
the Federal Rules' pleading regime, additional features of the Rules,
and other pronouncements of the Supreme Court. 82 Federal judges
thus lack the authority to demand stricter pleading in civil rights
75 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius translates
as "the .expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACKS LAw
DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990). See generally SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST.§ 47.23
(5th ed. 1992) (discussing use of phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius).
76 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
77 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
78 See Monel~ 436 U.S. at 689-91; Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163.
79 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
so Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163. The Supreme Court applied virtually
identical phrasing and reasoning to its treatment of Rules 19 and 24 in Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 767 (1989). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Rights
Procedural Problems, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 801, 802-03 (1992) (discussing Martin v.

Wilks).
81 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see also Marcus, supra note 6, at 439-40
(discussing cited argument); accord Tobias, supra note 6, at 300. New proposals
to amend certain discovery provisions in the Federal Rules would afford judges
greater control over discovery. See Judicial Conference of the United States,
Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26, 30(a) (2), 33(a)
(Sept. 1992). See generally Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery,
145 F.RD. 139 (1993) (examining conflicting procedural reform efforts);
Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Ref<nm, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263 (1992)
(discussing proposed amendments to rules regarding pretrial discovery).
82 See Marcus, supra note 6; Tobias, supra note 6.

370

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 27:357

actions. 83 The Federal Rules' drafters provided for heightened
pleading only in Rule 9(b) and refused to impose elevated requirements and fact pleading when recommending Rule 8 in 1938.84
Subsequent rule revisions altered none of these original standards. 85
Federal Rules amendments have preserved a flexible, pragmatic
scheme of pleading intended to serve limited purposes. When
judges dismiss civil rights actions at the pleading phase in the belief
that plaintiffs will not succeed on the merits, the judges effectively
require litigants to assemble evidence before they have taken discovery. That requirement contravenes traditional wisdom regarding
the information that plaintiffs are required to produce and that
judges may consider at this stage. 86
The Supreme Court in Leatherman properly suggested that federal
trial judges and parties could employ other procedures to eliminate
meritless actions. 87 For instance, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
that judges and litigants can invoke summary judgment under Rule
56 and rely upon provisions in the discovery rules to "weed out
unmeritorious claims sooner rather than later."88 Judges can apply
other mechanisms, such as Rule 16 procedures for pretrial conferences. Judges may seek guidance from the Eastern District of Virginia, which enjoys a reputation for its use of Rule 16 to resolve
disputes promptly. 89 Judges and parties might also employ meas83 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482
(5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J., concurring); Rotolo v. Borough of
Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 925-27 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, j., dissenting).
84 See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
85 See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d at 1482 (Higginbotham, J., concurring);
United States v. Gustin-Bacon Div., Certain-Teed Prods., 426 F.2d 539, 542-43
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 ( 1970); Thompson v. Village of Evergreen
Park, 503 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D. Ill. 1980); FED. R. Cw. P. 9(b); Wingate, supra
note 14, at 692.
86 See, e.g., Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill.
1982) ("We are at a loss as to how any plaintiff ... is supposed to allege with
specificity prior to discovery acts to which he or she personally was not exposed
.... ");Hill v. City of Atlanta, 91 F.R.D. 528, 532 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Marcus, supra
note 6, at 462-71.
·
87 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see also Tobias, supra note 6, at 300. This
assumes that plaintiffs pursue too many meritless civil rights actions, a
contention challenged by some. See, e.g., &tow, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting); Wingate, supra note 14, at 688.
88 Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see also supra note 81 and accompanying
text.
89 See FED. R. Cw. P. 16; see also Charles R. Richey, Ru/.e 16 Revisited: Reflections
for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525 (1992). See generally Tobias, supra

1994]

El.euated Pl.eading

371

ures covering, for example, case management and discovery under
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. 90
The imposition of stricter pleading in civil rights litigation has significant consequences for plaintiffs. Heightened pleading contravenes precepts of basic fairness by demanding that some litigants
satisfy more burdensome requirements without justification. Stringent pleading revives the repudiated notion of fact pleading and
applies the rejected idea of "disfavored claims"91 to a class oflawsuits
that the Supreme Court has declared is fundamental to liberty. 92
Elevated pleading also imposes onerous duties on a category of
parties who have limited ability to fulfill them. For example, numerous civil rights plaintiffs have relatively few resources and comparatively little access to information relevant to their cases. Stricter
pleading rules will require that they include information in their
complaints which they lack the time or money to obtain or can
secure only through discovery. 93 Finally, practically all of the factors
reviewed above apply to environmental litigation. Lower courts
should apply Leatherman to proscribe heightened pleading in environmental litigation.
note 6, at 291-92 (noting Rule 16's ability to increase district courts' power to
manage litigation); Tobias, Discretion, supra note 29, at 942-46 (same). For
analysis of the Eastern District of Virginia and its expeditious dispute
resolution, see Kim Dayton, Case Management in the Eastern District of Vi?ginia, 26
U.S.F. L. REv. 445 (1992). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform in the
Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 89, 98-99 (1993) (discussing district's
refusal to modify stringent control over civil docket).
90 SeeJudicial Improvements Act of 1990, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992)). See generally Linda S.
Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375
( 1992) (criticizing Civil Justice Reform Act's redistribution of procedural rulemaking power and impairment of federal courts' ability to control civil
litigation); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992)
(discussing civil justice reform in each federal government branch).
Numerous courts had implemented some of these and other techniques
through local rules. See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager:
The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REv. 770, 77089 (1981). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform and the Bal.kaniz.ation of
Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARiz. ST. LJ. 1393, 1396-99 (1992) (discussing
managerial judging and its codification by Federal Rules amendments).
91 See Marcus, supra note 6, at 4 71-73; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988).
92 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Newman v. Piggie
Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
93 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 6, at 300-01; Tobias, Rule 11, supra note 29, at
495-98.
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Applicability of Leatherman to Environmental Cases

Whether Leatherman prohibits enhanced pleading in environmental litigation is not obvious from the Court's opinion. Leatherman
proscribes heightened pleading for civil rights actions against a
municipality. Moreover, the Court did not purport to address the
imposition of elevated pleading in other types of lawsuits. The opinion stated that the case provided no occasion to examine whether
the Court's "qualified immunity jurisprudence would require
heightened pleading in cases involving individual government officials. "94 The Court, accordingly, may have been suggesting that it
was leaving open for future resolution whether courts could require
heightened pleading in other actions.
Nonetheless, the Court would probably reject elevated pleading
in environmental litigation, if faced with a case presenting this issue.
Many of the rationales that the Court employed in Leatherman apply
to environmental lawsuits. For example, heightened pleading in
environmental actions conflicts with the Rules' liberal, flexible
scheme of notice pleading. 95 Environmental cases, like civil rights
litigation, also do not involve fraud or mistake, so that Rule 9(b)
does not require particularity in pleading. 96 Moreover, the
Supreme Court, following Leatherman, would probably find that
courts can only require particularized pleading in environmental
lawsuits with an amendment to Rule 9(b), not through judicial construction. Thus, courts and parties must depend on summary judgment and control of discovery to resolve frivolous environmental
actions earlier in the litigation process. 97
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF

LEAr.HERMAN's

APPLICATION

To

ENVIRONMENTAL CAsES

Federal judges should apply the holding and underlying rationales in Leatherman to environmental litigation. Plaintiffs who pursue environmental cases should not have to satisfy heightened
pleading requirements. Such requirements effectively revive fact
94 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993).
95 Id. at 1163; see a/,so supra notes 6-10, 71 and accompanying text.
96 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; see a/,so FED. R. Cw. P. 9(b); supra notes
74-76 and accompanying text. Moreover, few environmental cases implicate
the liability of municipalities or their employees.
97 See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; supra notes 79-81 and accompanying
text.
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pleading that the Civil Rules Committee rejected when drafting the
original Federal Rules. 98 Judges should demand that these plaintiffs
only meet Rule S's notice pleading requirements. Notice pleading
was intended to be liberal and general, and judges should flexibly
and practically enforce these pleading requirements. 99
Therefore, judges should rarely grant motions to dismiss when
defendants argue that environmental plaintiffs have not pied sufficient facts. Judges should also grant plaintiffs leave to amend their
pleadings or to refile. 10 For instance, the Western District of New
York in Alluy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc. permitted the
plaintiff to amend its complaint to include the dates response costs
were incurred. 101 The New Jersey District Court judge in United
States v. Price dismissed some of plaintiff's CERCIA claims without
prejudice. 102 A Northern District of Texas judge allowed plaintiffs
to replead, even though the judge sharply criticized the papers that
plaintiffs initially filed. 103
Judges should also recognize that a number of environmental
plaintiffs, such as local citizens' groups and homeowners' associations, may possess comparatively limited resources and lack access to
important material for pleading and proving their cases. 104 Judges,
thus, should not dismiss these plaintiffs' suits early in the litigation.
Judges should facilitate plaintiffs' discovery by, for instance, liberally
granting plaintiffs' discovery requests so that litigants can have an
opportunity to prove their claims. In short,judges should be solicitous of the needs of environmental plaintiffs. Congress has indi-

°

See supra notes 6-10, 71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 6-10, 71-73 and accompanying text.
lOO See Leatherman, 113 S. Ct. at 1163; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962); United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 316 (1960); FED. R CIV. P. 15.
See generally Lewis, supra note 19, at 1511-39 (reviewing history of Rule 15(c)
and its application to relation back principle in diversity and federal question
cases).
101 See Alloy Briquetting Corp. v. Niagara Vest, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 713, 717-18
(W.D.N.Y. 1991); supra note 53 and accompanying text.
102 See United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.NJ. 1983); supra
note 38 and accompanying text.
103 See Collin County v. HA.V.E.N., 654 F. Supp. 943, 952-54 (N.D. Tex.
1987).
104 See Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rul.e 11, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 429, 453-57 (1992). Plaintiffs in some CERCIA cases may have substantial
resources. See, e.g., CBS v. Henkin, 803 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ind. 1992). See
generally Tobias, Rul.e 11, supra note 29, at 495-98 (noting that characteristics of
civil rights cases, including parties' resource disparities, make litigants and
counsel vulnerable to Rule 11 sanction motions).
98
99
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cated in substantive, procedural and fee-shifting legislation that
these types of plaintiffs should receive favorable judicial treatment,
because they vindicate the statutory purpose of cleaning up the
·environment. 105
Judges and environmental defendants should also invoke measures that respond to concerns otherwise addressed by elevated
pleading requirements. 106 Judges and defendants should employ
traditional devices, such as motions for summary judgment under
Rule 56 and the discovery provisions of Rules 26 through 37, to
eliminate frivolous or weak cases early in the litigation. 107 Judges
and defendants can also rely on relatively new techniques, namely
the prescriptions in Federal Rule 16 and the procedures that district
courts are implementing under the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990. 108
CONCLUSION

A number of federal judges have imposed heightened pleading
requirements on environmental plaintiffs since the mid-1980s, particularly on plaintiffs pursuing CERCLA actions. The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Leatherman proscribes elevated pleading
in civil rights cases against municipalities. The holding and reasoning in that opinion appear applicable to environmental cases. Federal judges, therefore, should cease demanding that environmental
plaintiffs satisfy stricter pleading requirements and should only
require that they satisfy the general, flexible notice pleading regime
of the Federal Rules embodied in Rule 8.

105 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(i), 9622 (Supp. 1990) (providing examples of
provisions for intervention and settlement in CERCLA); 33 U.S.C. § 1365
(Supp. 1990) (providing examples of provisions for citizen suits and fee
shifting in Clean Water Act). See generally Tobias, Discretion, supra note 29, at
962 (suggesting similar ideas regarding civil rights litigation).
106 See, e.g., Cash Energy v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 898 (D. Mass. 1991);
Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1251-52 (M.D. Pa. 1990); see supra
notes 15-16, 27, 47, 49 and accompanying text.
107 See FED. R Cw. P. 26-37, 56; supra notes 81, 87-88 and accompanying
text.
108 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.

